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ARTICLES
THE METRICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS: AND WHY PROPOSED
EVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AMENDMENTS
DON'T MEASURE UP
J. B. Ruhl*
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman is seated in a restaurant in Moscow, during Soviet rule, and is
handed a menu. After a few minutes she orders the roast pork, but is told
they no longer serve that dish. She orders the chicken and is told it has sold
out. She orders the fish and is told it has gone bad. She orders the beef and
is told it has been overcooked. Exasperated, she asks whether she has been
handed the menu or the constitution.1
One way of describing the United States Constitution is as a set of
instructions for making decisions about the design and operation of
society. Much as a computer's operating-system software provides not
answers, but rather the way of arriving at answers, the Constitution is
heavy on institutional decision-making rules and light on what form
the finished product of those decisions should take.2 For the most
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law (1998-99), George Washington University
Law School; Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. This Article
benefited greatly from comments received during presentations at the University of
Houston Law Center, the St. Louis University School of Law, and the George
Washington University Law School. Pat Kelley, Tom McAffee, John Nagle, and John
Dernbach also provided comments, guidance, and inspiration, and Eric Hansell (SIU
'99) and Todd Rudloff (SIU '99) provided valuable research assistance. The George
Washington University Law School also graciously provided research funding support.
Please direct questions and comments to jruhl@main.nlc.gwu.edu.
1 A joke told to me by the Bulgarian jurist and scholar Ewa Letowska.
2 As John Hart Ely observed, the general approach of the Constitution is "not
one of trying to set forth some governing ideology... but rather one of ensuring a
durable structure for the ongoing resolution of policy disputes." JoHN HART ELY, Da-
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part, this focus on the "operating system" as the function of the Con-
stitution has remained intact for over two centuries, with very few so-
cial policies having been embodied in constitutional text.3 But as
modern society has focused debate increasingly on competing visions
of social form, advocates have turned increasingly to constitutional
amendment proposals as a means of dictating their respective visions.
4
In other words, we have become more willing seriously to entertain
proposals to write social policy decisions-not merely decision-making
instructions-directly into the Constitution.
5
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST 90 (1980). See also Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are
Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 441 (1983)
("The Constitution serves both as a blueprint for government operations and as an
authoritative statement of the nation's most important and enduring values.").
3 In the last century, for example, only one amendment designed overtly to pre-
scribe social policy has been ratified, see U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, and it was subse-
quently repealed,, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. The remaining amendments ratified
during that period concern voting rights or purely constitutive issues. See infta text
accompanying notes 29-54.
4 See DAVID E. KyVIG, ExPLIcIT AND AUTHENTIC Acts 425 (1996) ("[A] bevy of
amendments, designed as much to articulate a position as to achieve adoption, would
flourish in the 1980s when striking a constitutional posture became a popular means
of dealing with besetting problems of government.").
5 Besides the environmental quality amendment proposals that provide the case
study for this Article, examples of recent social policy amendment proposals that have
received serious attention include: (1) the religious equality amendment, see Bruce E.
Lowry, Jr., The New Discrimination in America: In Defense of the Religious Equality Amend-
ment, 16 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 205 (1996); (2) the school prayer amendment, see
Walter Dellinger, The Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Constitution, 95 YALE
L.J. 1631 (1986); Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46
MERCER L. REV. 1123 (1995); Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer
Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1983); (3) the crime victims' rights amendment,
see Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARiz. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 839 (1997); (4) the flag burning amendment, see Frank Michelmen,
Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1337 (1990); (5) the
human life amendment banning abortions, see David Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The
Potential Reach of a Human Life Amendment, 8 AM.J.L. & MED. 97 (1982); and (6) the
Equal Rights Amendment, see MARY FRANcEs BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986); JANE J.
MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986).
A number of recent amendment proposals address the mechanics of govern-
ment, particularly Congress, and thus are more consistent with the "operating
software" function of the Constitution. These include: (1) a congressional term limits
amendment, seeJ. Richard Brown, Coming to Terms with Congress: A Defense of Congres-
sional Term Limits, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 1095 (1993); (2) the fiscal supermajority rule
amendment, see Michael B. Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal
Supermajoity Rules, 13 J.L. & POL. 705 (1997); (3) the amendment to prohibit un-
funded mandates, see Paul Gillmor & Fred Eames, Reconstruction of Federalism: A Consti-
tutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded Mandates, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (1994);
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Reflecting this trend, proposals to add an environmental quality
amendment (EQA) to the Constitution have become fashionable
again. EQA proposals first surfaced at the national level in the late
1960s and had their heyday in the early 1970s, 6 on the coat-tails of the
environmentalism euphoria that culminated in the first Earth Day.7
By the mid-1970s, however, the command-and-control regime of fed-
eral environmental protection legislation had evolved with unprece-
dented speed into a juggernaut of the administrative state.8 The
statutory regime eclipsed the notion that an EQA might be needed to
catalyze the translation of the environmentalism ethic into hard legal
and (4) the balanced budget amendment, see E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conven-
tions and the Deficit, 1985 DuxE L.J. 1077.
6 Typical of amendment resolutions introduced in Congress during that period
was one purporting to protect "[t]he right of the people to clean air, pure water,
freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and
esthetic qualities of the environment. . . ." H.RJ. Res. 1321, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968). For summaries of this and other early EQA proposals, seeJ. William Futrell,
Environmental Rights and the Constitution, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 43, 50 (1988); Pamela B. Schmaltz, Is It Timefor an
Environmental Amendment?, 38 Loy. L. REV. 451, 461-62 (1993).
7 For a first-hand account of the events leading to Earth Day 1970 by the founder
of the idea, see Milo Mason, Interview: Gaylord Nelson, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Sum-
mer 1995, at 72. The growing public mood in favor of environmental regulation may
have spawned the first EQAs, but was far more pivotal in ushering in the federal statu-
tory program of the 1970s. SeeJ. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY
§1.2(H) (2), at 40 (1993); PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAv: THE PUBLIC REGULA-
TION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 99-110 (1991) (tracing the surge in public mood and
concluding that "the growing environmental movement was to stimulate relatively
radical changes in law, most notably at the federal level"); Dinah Bear, The National
Environmental Policy Act: Its Origins and Evolutions, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995,
at 3-4 (describing public mood as a critical factor in the enactment of the National
Environmental Policy Act); C. Peter Gopelrud III, Water Pollution Law: Milestones from
the Past and Anticipation of the Future, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 7, 8
(describing public mood as a critical factor in the enactment of the Clean Water Act).
8 Described as the "explosion of environmental law," from 1970 through 1976,
in quick order Congress newly enacted or substantially amended ten major environ-
mental regulation statutes covering air, water, and land pollution, project planning,
workplace safety, manufacturing, species protection, and public drinking water. See
Futrell, supra note 7, §1.2(I) (1)-(3), at 43-45 (collecting statutes); ROBERT V. PERCI-
VAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 106-10 (2d ed. 1996) (same). That record
was nearly duplicated during the same period in the field of natural resources protec-
tion. See Futrell, supra note 7, § 1.2(I) (3), at 48 (collecting statutes). The process
continued into the 1980s, albeit at a slower pace. See PERCIVAL, supra, at 111-12 (col-
lecting statutes). Some laws were changed more than once in this period, each time
boosting the degree of federal dominance. SeeJohn P. Dwyer, The Practice ofFederalism
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1183-85 (tracing changes to federal air
pollution control legislation).
1999]
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and policy frameworks. 9 EQA proposals thus gradually fell out of
favor during the late 1970s and were virtually unmentioned in the
1980s.10
Amazingly, however, notwithstanding the phenomenal legal and
political infrastructure that has built up at all levels of government
around the goal of environmental protection since the first Earth Day,
the push for an EQA is back in full force. Since 1990, several such
measures have been offered by groups as diverse as New Jersey fifth
graders and well-funded environmental preservation organizations."
Most prominently, members of thirty-seven state legislatures launched
an initiative to have such a resolution introduced in Congress. 12
Their proposed EQA declares:
The natural resources of the nation are the heritage of present and
future generations. The right of each person to clean and healthful
air and water, and to the protection of other natural resources of
the nation, shall not be infringed by any person.' 3
These two sentences, faithful to the constitutional tradition of
conciseness, express an elegant message of national commitment to
environmental protection and to a future of environmental sus-
tainability. Indeed, the revival of EQAs as serious proposals can be
9 See Futrell, supra note 6, at 50; Schmaltz, supra note 6, at 462.
10 The nation's largest environmental group, the National Wildlife Federation,
proposed an EQA in the 1980s, see Futrell, supra note 6, at 51, but other than that
"[t] he idea of an environmental amendment has lain dormant for twenty years and is
only now gathering steam." Schmaltz, supra note 6, at 462 n.70.
11 See Schmaltz, supra note 6, at 464-67 (summarizing proposals, and making one
too).
12 See Richard L. Brodsky & Richard L. Russman, A Constitutional Initiative, DE-
FENDERS, Fall 1996, at 37 (two state legislators lay out their plan for the EQA); see also
Roger Schlickeisen, Epilogue: The Argument for a Constitutional Amendment to Protect Liv-
ing Nature, in BIODrvERsrrY AND THE LAW 221-42 (WilliamJ. Snape ed., 1996) (outlin-
ing the case for an EQA).
13 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37. Resolutions requesting the United
States Congress to submit this EQA language to the states have been introduced in a
number of states, albeit none with success. See, e.g., Md. H.J.R. 2 (1997); N.H. S.J.R. 3
(1997); N.J. A.C.R. 38 (1998); Tex. H.C.R. 13 (1997); Va. S.J.R. 230 (1996); Wis. A.J.R.
35 (1997). Schlickeisen's EQA proposal also emphasizes intergenerational rights, but
limits the effect to living natural resources:
The living natural resources in the United States are the common property
of all the people, including generations yet to come. All persons and their
progeny have an inalienable, enforceable right to the benefits of those re-
sources for themselves and their posterity. The United States and every State
shall ensure assure that the use of those resources is sustainable and that
they are conserved and maintained for the benefit of all the people.
Schlickeisen, supra note 12, at 243.
[VOL. 74:2
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traced to the emergence of a new theme of nvironmentalism-bi-
odiversity conservation. 14 Within roughly the past decade, the scien-
tific community has distilled a revised scientific paradigm of
ecosystem dynamics into the discipline of conservation biology' 5 and
has percolated the new model into legal and policy proposals at all
levels of government. 16 The swiftness with which the biodiversity
14 See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Essay on the Bill of Rights: Should We Green the Bill?,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 159; Roger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Future Genera-
tions: An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TuL. ENVTL. LJ. 181 (1994). Bi-
odiversity is "[t] he variety of organisms considered at all levels, from genetic variants
to the same species through arrays of species to arrays of genera, families, and still
higher taxonomic levels." EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DrVEnsrry OF LIF 393 (1992). See
also Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (1992) (defining biologi-
cal diversity as "the variability among living organisms... includ~ing] diversity within
species, between species and of ecosystems"); UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, THREATS TO BIOLOGICAL DIVERSrIY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1990) (bi-
ological diversity "is the variety of life on all levels of organization, represented by the
number and relative frequencies of items").
15 Conservation biology has emerged as a biological sciences discipline largely in
the past decade, as traced by its chief literature and research outlet, the journal Con-
servation Biology. A focal point of conservation biology research has been to demon-
strate the often pernicious effects of habitat fragmentation and loss of species. The
focus of scientific research geared towards ecosystem-level dynamics has revealed the
dramatic impacts that habitat loss has had on biodiversity generally. See, e.g., UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OUR LIVING RESOURCES (1996); U.S. Dep't of
the Interior/National Biological Service, Biological Rep. 28, Endangered Ecosystems
of the United States: A Preliminary Assessment of Loss and Degradation (U.S. Dep't
of the Interior/National Biological Service) (1995); Scott K. Robinson et al., Regional
Forest Fragmentation and the Nesting Success of Migratory Birds, SCIENCE, Mar. 31, 1995, at
1987.
16 See Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diver-
sity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991); James Drodzdowski, Saving an Endangered Act: The
Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 553
(1995); Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 869, 959 (1997); J. B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web
of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995). For a summary of the ecosystem management and bi-
odiversity conservation policy formulation initiatives of eighteen federal agencies, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EcOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL AGENCY AcTIVI-
TIES, CRS Rep. No. 94-339 (1994). Ecosystem management and biodiversity conserva-
tion are now standard fare of environmental groups' policy proposals. See, e.g.,
BIODIvESrlY AND THE LAw, supra note 12 ("The assumption in this book is that bi-
odiversity, and lots of it, should be conserved and preserved by law."); THE KEYSTONE
CENTER, THE KEYSTONE CENTER DIALOGUE ON ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1996);
STEVEN YAFFEE ET AL., THE WILDERINSS SOCIETY, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1996). For differing views on this new paradigm of conservation pol-
icy, compare R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management, 8 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 27 (1994) (advocating movement towards this approach) and R. Edward
1-999]
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theme has unified environmental protection policy surpasses even the
speed with which the first generation of environmental legislation
came on line, and EQA proposals are a means of embodying this
movement as nothing less than a constitutive norm for society. His-
tory is thus, in a sense, repeating itself, as the banner-holders of bi-
odiversity rush toward EQA proposals as a means of securing
permanent political and moral ground much as Earth Day supporters
did over twenty-five years ago.
The problem for the champions of biodiversity is that, without
exception, every EQA proposal made in the past and being put on the
table today is an absolute failure in the sense of approaching what
makes a sound amendment to the Constitution. Indeed, no commen-
tator or legislator who has proposed an EQA has endeavored to ex-
plain why an EQA would be constitutionally sound, as opposed to being
good for the environment. The latter proposition is debatable, 17 but
the former is not a close call-an EQA does not belong in the
Constitution.
There have been over ten thousand proposed amendments to the
Constitution.' 8 Only a handful have become a part of our law, and
only one obviously unsound amendment 9 has made it through the
Grumbine, Reflections on "What is Ecosystem Management," 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41
(1997) (same), with Rebecca W. Thomson, "Ecosystem Management" Great Idea, But
What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 42
(pointing out difficulties of the approach).
17 I do not intend to debate it at length here. To be sure, whether the proposed
EQA would fare well under the evaluative standards I propose herein for constitu-
tional amendments may tell us something about how well it would work on behalf of
the environmental protection goals it espouses, as it may be that an amendment that
fares poorly under my criteria would not likely achieve its normative objectives. But it
is possible for an amendment effectively to achieve its normative goals and nonethe-
less pose serious concerns with respect to constitutional integrity. My focus thus is
strictly on how the EQA and other amendment proposals can be evaluated with refer-
ence to the Constitution as an institution. For a brief discussion of the EQA in that
regard, see J. B. Ruhl, An Environmental Rights Amendment: Good Message, Bad Idea, 11
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1997, at 46.
18 See JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-1995, ix-xi, 363-80 (1996) (collating pro-
posals by year); RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE
LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169
(1993); Ruth B. Ginsburg, On Amending the Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 681-92 (1990).
19 I refer, of course, to the Eighteenth Amendment and the era of Prohibition it
imposed. For a thorough discussion of the rise and fall of national prohibition and
the constitutional issues surrounding the adoption and repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment, see Thomas E. Heard, Proposed Constitutional Amendments as a Research
Tool: The Example of Prohibition, 84 LAW LIBR. J. 499 (1992).
[VOL. 74:2
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Constitution's rigorous Article V amendment process. 20 Article V thus
appears to serve as a strong filter against wrongheaded decision-dictat-
ing amendments, and hence there is little chance that an EQA will
ever find its way into the Constitution. As a practical matter, the dis-
cussion with respect to EQAs could end here.
But the vigor with which EQA proposals are made suggests that it
would be useful to do more than simply rely on the procedural diffi-
culties of amending the Constitution as our insurance against folly. In
addition, for purposes of articulating why other proposed social policy
amendments might or might not make sense as a matter of constitu-
tional framework, it would be useful to develop a set of general stan-
dards for measuring what makes for a sound amendment to the
Constitution.21 Perhaps because there have been so few amendments,
and only one of those a disaster, no one has collected such a set of
evaluation metrics for constitutional amendments.
This Article develops such a framework for evaluating the sound-
ness of proposed social policy amendments to the Constitution, using
the current EQA proposals as a case study to test the framework's ap-
plication. In this sense I am proposing a theory that does not depend
on evaluating the normative substance of the underlying proposed
amendment. Indeed, it would not matter whether an EQA was "pro-
20 See U.S. CONST. art. V. For discussions of the Article V amending procedures as
an obstacle to new amendments, see RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTrrUTIoNAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION] ;JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-13 (1994); DonaldJ. Boudreaux & A-C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution:
An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 111
(1993); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amend-
ment Process, 97 HARv. L. REV. 386 (1983); Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V.: Term
Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971 (1994). For a
survey of procedures for amending various state and national constitutions, see Elai
Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrench-
ment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 251 (1996).
21 Although the Founders devoted considerable debate to the amending proce-
dure, including whether there should be any accommodation for amendment, see
Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L.
REV. 155, 160-75 (1997); Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change:
James Madison Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEx. TECH. L. REV.
2443 (1990), virtually none of the ratifying debates focused on what kind of amend-
ment would be appropriate. Similarly, the focus on institutional fit, rather than Arti-
cle V procedural issues or a proposal's normative merit, is not common in the
modem constitutional law literature. An exception is an ongoing effort by one legal
organization to establish evaluative standards for constitutional amendments that
blends institutional, procedural, and normative criteria. See Citizens for the Constitu-
tion, "Great and Extraordinary Occasions": Developing Standards for Constitutional
Change (1997 final draft 'on file with author) [hereinafter Developing Standards].
1999]
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environment" or "anti-environment," whatever those highly charged
political labels mean; rather, any EQA attempting to capture a norma-
tive statement about the environment and plug it into the United
States Constitution is simply a bad idea.22
22 This is as good a point as any to acknowledge that many states and other na-
tions have a constitutional provision that guarantees some form of environmental
rights; however, for the most part "[t]hey are more expressive of a sentimental urge
than an exercise in rearranging power," and "[t] he experience ... suggests that they
have not been important legal tools for environmental protection." Futrell, supra
note 6, at 51; see also Elizabeth S. Goldman & Stewart E. Sterk, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
1301, 1304 ("Many [state] constitutional provisions have little to do with the structure
of state government, but reflect instead a desire by drafters to indicate the importance
of a particular issue by enshrining it in the supreme law of the state."); John L. Hor-
wich, Montana's Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-Delu-
sion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 326 (1996) ("Those who believed state constitutional
environmental provisions represented a watershed for environmental protection have
been sorely disappointed."). It is dangerous to extrapolate from the constitutional
experience of states and other nations to draw conclusions about the United States
Constitution. For example, many states have amended their constitutions hundreds
of times, suggesting a vastly different attitude about amending than is the case for the
Constitution. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL. L.
REv. 2121, 2140-41 (1996) ("At the state level, change occurs much more often in the
form of amendments, the entire constitution is sometimes revised in constitutional
conventions, and the constitution becomes, in adapting to changing circumstances,
much longer and more like ordinary statutes."); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of
Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 20, at 237,
247-50. The fact that some states and nations have EQAs thus does not necessarily
mean the Constitution should, nor does the fact that few of the EQAs have mattered
much in the law of those states and nations necessarily mean that an EQA in the
Constitution would be inconsequential. Hence, I limit the discussion of those other
jurisdictions to experiences that may meaningfully inform the debate about a federal
EQA and the broader question of how to evaluate constitutional amendments. For
more comprehensive discussions of state EQAs, see Richard 0. Brooks, A Constitu-
tionalRight to a Healthful Environment, 16 VT. L. REv. 1063 (1992); Mary Ellen Cusack,
Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173 (1993); Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental
Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 333 (1993); MargaretJ. Fried & MoniqueJ. Van Damme, Environmental Protec-
tion in a Constitutional Setting, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 1369 (1995); Greg L.Johnson, Consti-
tutional Environmental Protection in Louisiana: Losing the Reason in the Rule of
Reasonableness, 42 Loy. L. REv. 97 (1996); A. E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the
Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193 (1972); Fernando M. Pinguelo, Laboratory of Ideas: One
State's Successful Attempt to Constitutionally Ensure A Healthier Environment, 4 BuFF. ENVTrL.
L.J. 269 (1997); Oliver A. Pollard III, A Promise Unfulfilled: Environmental Provisions in
State Constitutions and the Self-Execution Question, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 351 (1988);
Neil A.F. Popovi, Pursuing Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and
State Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338 (1996); and for thoughtful discussions of
other nations' EQAs, see Gyula Bandi, The Right to Environment in Theory and Practice:
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To develop this thesis of constitutional metrics, an important first
step is to define the method for describing and comparing the rele-
vant quaiities of different constitutional amendments. I develop such
a classification model in Part I of the Article based on an amend-
ment's institutional "fit" within the Constitution. Most other classifi-
cations of amendments focus either on the social factors that led to
the amendment 3 or the effects the amendment had on society.24 But
regardless of whatever exogenous conditions motivate their proposal,
and regardless of the effects they may have on law and society, each
amendment can be mapped on a biaxial matrix based on its text's
constitutive function and target. The function axis describes the
amendment's basic institutional role among four possibilities: (1) al-
tering the operational rules of government; (2) prohibiting specified
government action; (3) creating or affirming rights; or (4) expressing
aspirational goals. 25 The target axis describes the possible social rela-
tions that are the target of the function: (1) intra- and intergovern-
mental relations; (2) relations between government and citizen; or
(3) relations between citizens.
Classifying amendments in this manner illustrates the important
point that the text of very few existing amendments ventures into the
aspiration statement function or the citizen-citizen relation target, and
no existing amendment purports to do both-that is, to establish aspi-
rations for citizen-citizen relations. When a proposed amendment
strays into those zones, as the EQA does, some basis for evaluation is
The Hungarian Experience, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 439 (1993); Ernst Brandl & Hartwin
Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis
of Experiences Abroad, 16 HAuv. ENvrL. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1992); Elizabeth F. Brown, In
Defense of Environmental Rights in East European Constitutions, 1993 U. CI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 191.
23 Some treatments group the amendments into historical amending episodes
usually corresponding with the Bill of Rights (1791-1804), Reconstruction
(1865-1870), the Progressive Era (1913-1920), and the civil rights movement
(1960s), in which the exogenous political and social conditions precipitated certain
kinds of amendments. See Vn, supra note 18, at 19-24; Ginsburg, supra note 18, at
681-86.
24 One commentator classifies amendments based on the degree to which they
forestall or initiate change in society, see VILE, supra note 18, at 26, while two others
focus on an amendment's effects on economic efficiency, see Boudreaux & Pritchard,
supra note 20, at 111.
25 One early classification of amendments and proposed amendments focuses on
part of the function side of my proposed classification system, dividing the measures
into those which affect the form of government, with subcategories for legislative,
executive, and judicial forms, and those affecting the powers of government. See
Michael Angelo Musmanno, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, H.R. Doc
No. 551 (1929).
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needed to determine whether the unusual approach of the measure is
justified.
Responding to that need, in Part II of the Article, I outline the
qualities that are necessary to make a sound amendment to the Con-
stitution and which must be demanded rigorously of any proposed
amendment that purports to express aspirational goals, to address citi-
zen-citizen relations, or, worst of all, to do both as does the EQA. I
have derived these principles from a rather amorphous body of com-
mentaries and other sources in which one or more of these qualities
has been discussed or suggested. When collected into a unified the-
ory, they fall into two categories of "filters" by which to evaluate social
policy amendments: first-level filters that define whether an amend-
ment to dictate a particular social policy generally is socially accepta-
ble and institutionally necessary given conditions in the social and
political realms, and second-level filters used to test the imple-
mentability of specific proposals to embody the social policy decision.
Using that model, I explore the following qualities that should be
present in proposed social policy amendments:
First-Level Filters
1. Supported by broad social approval.
2. Not capable of being fully implemented through other polit-
ical and legal institutions.
Second-Level Filters
1. Reducible to legal principles that are binding in effect.
2. Sufficiently clear to minimize unanticipated interpretations.
3. Enduring even in the face of shifting political climates.
Some commentators have focused on one or a few of these quali-
ties either because of personal priorities or because obvious deficien-
cies of a particular proposed amendment did not necessitate a
broader focus. My purpose here is to synthesize the current
hodgepodge of theses into one framework that can be used to test any
social policy amendment proposal. The synthesis is important, I posit,
because satisfying one or a few of these qualities is not sufficient to
make a sound amendment. Indeed, because these qualities, when
stated as a whole, contain countervailing forces, very few proposed
amendments can satisfy all of them. And that is how it should be.
Throughout Part II of the Article, as I describe each filter, I also
demonstrate the operation of the framework, the importance of the
conflicting constraints demanded by the synthesis, and the difficulty
of passing the test imposed, by subjecting the EQA to critical scrutiny
under each item in the checklist. Indeed, because it is partly aspira-
tional in nature and deals with a subject matter that continues to be at
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the center of social and political controversy, the EQA classically illus-
trates how difficult it can be for social policy amendments to satisfy
any of the requisite qualities. Any EQA that could attract broad social
support would require textual drafting manipulations that would dis-
solve the provision into utter ambiguity; any EQA that could be
drafted with sufficient precision to avoid ambiguity and result in bind-
ing legal principles would lose significant social support and would be
too narrow to be easily implemented; and so on. The conflicting con-
straints demanded by the proposed criteria allow very few proposals to
qualify-only the most accepted, important, necessary, enforceable,
clear, and enduring need apply for a position in the Constitution.
II. CLASSIFICATION METRICS: MEASURING CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS BASED ON INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION AND TARGET
SocIAL RELATIONS
To revise an operating system, one must do something to some-
thing in the system. In other words, the measure must have a function
and a target. Every proposed amendment has a function and a target
as well, in the sense that it is designed to alter the current constitutive
structure in some way by affecting the rights, powers, or composition
of some constitutional actor.26 Although classifications of amend-
ments based on exogenous social conditions or effects are useful in
the evaluation of amendments, I demonstrate in this section that a
classification based on a textual analysis of function and target pro-
vides tremendous insight into the constitutive status of amendments
and thereby reveals much about the danger lurking in EQAs and
other proposed social policy amendments.
A. A Biaxial System for Classifing Amendments
It is important not to allow the process of classification to obscure
the reason for the differences that allow the classification in the first
place. 27 Ultimately, a proposed amendment lives or dies because of
politics. But a classification system based not on analysis of political
conditions, but rather on what the amendment says, will nonetheless
inform the political debate for proposed amendments and help us
26 There are exceptions, such as the proposed amendment to change the name
of the nation to the United States of Earth. See Daniel L. May, The Third Vice President
of the United States of Earth, 73 A.BA. J. 76 (1987).
27 Consider, for example, Karl von Linn6's teleologically motivated taxonomic
classification of species, which remains the foundation of modem species classifica-
tions (the Linnean system), but which Charles Darwin, not Linn6, explained in terms
of cause. SeeJONATHAN WENER, THE BEAx OF THE FINCH 20-25 (1994).
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understand how the politics matter. The textually announced func-
tion and target of a proposed amendment is, after all, what the politics
must evaluate, process, and decide. 28 Moreover, whoever has drafted
a proposed amendment presumably has taken politics into mind.
Hence, I engage in the exercise of textual classification based on func-
tion and target with the acknowledgment that it does not replace
political analysis of amendments, but with the conviction that it illumi-
nates that analysis.
1. Function
The first element to extract from the amendment's text is the
avowed functional purposes, for which a spectrum of possibilities ex-
ists. Closest to the operating system model of the Constitution, an
amendment may simply change the way the business of governing is
conducted. At the other end of the spectrum are amendments laden
with aspirational expressions carrying little or no functional objective.
Between are amendments that police relations between constitutional
actors, either by prohibiting some defined act or by creating or af-
firming a defined right. Examples exist among the current amend-
ments to the Constitution for all but the aspirational category.
a. Operational
Many amendments since the Bill of Rights, and particularly since
the 1950s, are purely operational in function. For example, the most
recent Amendment, the Twenty-Seventh, simply lays out when pay
raises for Senators and Representatives may take effect.2 9 The text
leaves unspoken whatever exogenous conditions or aspirations moti-
vated the amendment, and expresses no prohibitions or rights. It is
pure operating system text. Similarly, all or parts of the Twelfth,30
Fourteenth,31 Sixteenth,3 2 Seventeenth, 33 Twentieth,34 Twenty-First,3 5
28 See Tribe, supra note 2, at 440 ("The Constitution tells us something, and what it
says-although necessarily read through lenses we ourselves bring to the task-must
be the touchstone for evaluating the substantive appropriateness of any proposed
amendment.").
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XII (establishing the procedures of the Electoral College).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 2-3 (establishing apportionment of Representa-
tives and criteria for disqualifying persons from office).
32 U.S. CONsr. amend. XVI (establishing Congress' income taxation power).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (establishing the composition and election of the
Senate).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XX (establishing the dates of the terms of the President
and Vice-President).
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Twenty-Second,3 6 Twenty-Third,3 7 and Twenty-Fifth38 Amendments
are purely operational in function.
b. Prohibitory
We associate the majority of existing amendments with rights,
usually the rights of citizens. The text of most of those amendments,
however, is prohibitory in function, so that the rights are established
by negative implication.3 9 For example, the First Amendment estab-
lishes the "right" to freedom of speech through the prohibition that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."
While it is often noted that this and other amendments in the Bill of
Rights addressed what were considered pre-established rights,40 the
operative function of this and many other amendments associated
with rights is purely prohibitory in focus. Thus, the operative lan-
guage of all or parts of the Second,41' Third,42 Fourth,43 Fifth,44
Eighth, 45 and Ninth46 Amendments, and of the portion of the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporating due process rights with respect to
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (establishing the maximum terms of the President).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (establishing the District of Columbia's representa-
fives to Congress).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (establishing the order of succession to the Presi-
dency in cases of death or resignation, the procedures for filling of vacancies in the
office of Vice-President, and procedures for removal of the President).
39 See generally Futrell, supra note 6, at 52; Schmaltz, supra note 6, at 457-58.
40 See ViLE, supra note 18, at 19-20; BERNSTEIN & ACEL, supra note 18, at 49.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. II (right to bear arms "shall not be infringed").
42 U.S. CONsT. amend. III ("no soldier shall" be quartered).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (rights against unreasonable search and seizure "shall
not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue").
44 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("no person shall be held" without indictment; "nor
shall any person be subject" to double jeopardy; "nor shall be compelled" to provide
witness against himself or herself, "nor be deprived" without due process; "nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation").
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.").
46 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (the enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to
deny or disparage" retained rights).
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the states,4 7 follows the prohibitory function model. And all of the
modern voting rights amendments follow this model.48
c. Rights Creating or Affirming
As the preceding discussion suggests, surprisingly few of the
amendments associated with rights focus textually on the positive cre-
ation or affirmation of rights. Nevertheless, although they embody
what were taken at the time of ratification as pre-existing rights, the
texts of the Sixth,49 Seventh, 50 and Tenth 5 Amendments purport to
create or affirm rights. The rights amendments since the Bill of
Rights follow the prohibitory function model without exception.
d. Aspirational
No purely aspirational expressions exist in any amendment to the
Constitution.5 2 Particularly given the prevalence of aspirational
human rights statements in international policy documents, some of
which have been incorporated in other nations' constitutions, 53 the
absence of aspirational text in the United States Constitution is one of
its defining characteristics. 54 Of course, many aspirational amend-
ments have been proposed, and nothing in the Constitution prevents
their adoption; hence, it is not inappropriate to include the category
47 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1 ("[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge" privileges and immunities; "nor shall any State deprive" life, etc. with-
out due process; "nor deny" equal protection).
48 The voting rights amendments follow the model: "The right of citizens of the
United States... to vote ... shall not be denied or abridged.. . ." See U.S. CONST.
amends. XV (race, color, servitude), XIX (gender), XXIV (poll tax), XXVI (age).
49 U.S. CONsT. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved .... ).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. X (powers not delegated to United States or prohibited to
the States are "reserved to the States ... or to the people").
51 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... ").
52 Some commentators count the Eighteenth Amendment as aspirational, see,
e.g., Futrell, supra note 6, at 52; however, while surely it was motivated primarily by
prohibition-minded aspirations, textually it was strictly prohibitory in nature. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 ("the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors . . .for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited").
53 See Paula Rhodes, An Afro-American Perspective: We the People and the Struggle for a
New World: The Constitution of the United States of America and International Human Rights,
1987 How. L.J. 705.
54 SeeJohn Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode ofJudicial Review, 37
MD. L. REV. 451, 484 (1978) ("[Olnly rarely has our Constitution attempted to tell
elected officials what substantive values to favor or disfavor. .. ").
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for purposes of classification (or, more accurately, to illustrate the
point of their absence).
2. Target
In order to have any effect, each functional statement in an
amendment must have a defined target in terms of whose operational
status or rights it alters. The existing amendments have taken three
approaches to defining targets, differing with respect to the social re-
lations involved.
a. Intra- and Intergovernmental
As the operational tasks of the Constitution are carried out by
government, all of the amendments I characterize as operational in
function also focus exclusively on intra- or inter governmental rela-
tions as their target, such as who may remove the President (intra-
governmental) 55 and how states elect federal officials (intergovern-
mental).56 Not surprisingly, the amendment in this category that
speaks most forcefully to relations between the federal and state sover-
eigns, the Eleventh Amendment, does so through the prohibitory
function model.57 In addition, the Tenth Amendment reserves for
the states (and people) powers not enumerated to the federal govern-
ment or prohibited to the states, and thus addresses relations between
the two governmental domains. 58
b. Government and Citizen
All of the amendments associated with rights, whether prohibi-
tory or positive in function, involve relations between government and
citizen. As noted above, the Tenth Amendment reserves unenumer-
ated and nonprohibited powers not only to the states, but also to the
people, and thus falls into two target categories. In addition, the Six-
teenth Amendment's operational creation of federal income-taxing
power necessarily targets government-citizen relations, as presumably
it is the citizens' income that is to be taxed.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (establishing states' sovereign immunity by stating the
prohibition that "[t] he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed").
58 U.S. GONsT. amend. X.
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c. Citizen and Citizen
The rare creature in the Constitution in terms of target is the
relation of citizen to citizen. Among existing amendments, only the
Thirteenth Amendment affects relations between citizens, abolishing
slavery and involuntary servitude through the prohibitory function
model.59 The Eighteenth Amendment also qualified as one of this
variety, given its broad prohibition of sales transactions between citi-
zens involving liquor.60 Beyond that, the existing amendments are si-
lent with respect to civil relations.
B. Lessons Learned and Applied
My purpose in engaging in the rather formalistic textual dissec-
tion of the existing amendments to the Constitution is to make one
point loudly and clearly: amendments purporting to express aspira-
tional values or regulate civil relations, or do both, should set off bells
and whistles in the political evaluation process. As the summary plot
in Figure 1 illustrates, only two amendments fitting that description
have passed through the eye of the Article V needle. One followed on
the heels of civil war, and the other-the unmitigated disaster of Pro-
hibition-is with us no longer. This history suggests that the political
process and the rigors of Article V have combined to erect a strong
screen against proposed amendments that fall outside the shaded area
in Figure 1-i.e., those straying far from the operating-system func-
tion of the Constitution. The darker shaded area represents the area
of the matrix most closely associated with the operating system func-
tion of the Constitution; the lighter shaded area includes amend-
ments one step away from that tighter configuration, but which are
nonetheless focused on the rules respecting rights and government.
The unshaded area, by contrast, includes aspirational statements and
civil relations, subject matter far from the core operating-system func-
tion, with the upper right hand corner of Figure 1-amendments that
are aspirational in function and targeted on civil relations-represent-
ing the farthest an amendment could stray from the Constitution's
basic purpose.
59 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
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FiGuRE 1
FUNCTION
ASPIRATIONAL
RIGHTS CREATING
OR AFFIRMING 10 10,6,7
PROHIBITORY 11 1, 2, 3,4,5,8,9, 13, (18)
14(§I), 15,19,24,26
OPERATIONAL 12,14(§2), 17,20, 16
21,22,23,25,27
INTRA- OR INTER- GOVERNMENT TO CITIZEN TO
GOVERNMENTAL CITIZEN CITIZEN
TARGETRELATIONS
To be sure, this retrospective classification of the existing amend-
ments imposes no normative evaluation of past or prospective "outli-
ers." Neither the Constitution itself nor the Framers' debates define
the outlier territory and place it off limits; rather, the apparent history
of amendments has evolved so as to disfavor amendments in the out-
lier zone. Even if the Framers had consciously decided to avoid or
prohibit what we today can describe as outlier amendments, that deci-
sion would always be subject to revisiting. But the fact that we have
stayed on a path away from outlier amendments, whether that has
been by deliberate policy or by accident, makes the case for staying on
that path more powerful. After more than two centuries, we still have
no meaningful experience with such amendments-i.e., how they
would interact with the body of the Constitution and the existing
amendments; how they would influence the evolution of sociolegal
policy; and how they would affect the perception of the Constitution
as a constitutive statement. They are, in other words, high risk pro-
positions. Hence, while I do not go so far as to suggest we should
disqualify proposed outlier amendments per se, I believe the history
of the existing amendments forcefully supports the case that we
should approach future outlier proposals with extreme caution.
Before asking the obvious questions regarding what evaluative cri-
teria the political process has or should have used to screen such
amendments, pause for a moment to ask where the EQA falls on this
classification system. Indeed, what is striking about the EQA is that it
is hard to tell exactly what its parameters are under the function-target
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classification system. I outline this target "space" in Figure 2. The
first sentence declares that "[t] he natural resources of the nation are
the heritage of present and future generations," thus appearing to
create or affirm rights by positive expression. The second sentence,
proclaiming that specified environmental quality rights "shall not be
infringed upon by any person," adopts a prohibitory function model
approach with citizen-citizen relations as its target. At a minimum,
therefore, the EQA falls squarely in the area defined by Box A in Fig-
ure 2.
FIGuRE 2
FUNCIHON
ASPIRATIONAL B
RIGHTS CREATING
OR AFFIRMING
C A
PROHIBITORY
OPERATIONAL
INTRA- OR INTER- GOVERNMENT TO CITIZEN TO
GOVERNMENTAL'" CITIZEN CITIZEN
TARGET RELATIONS
Arguably, however, the choice of the term heritage in the first sen-
tence, particularly when used with reference to generations, expresses
an aspirational social policy goal, as it is not readily apparent how a
future generation can have "heritage" in the strict legal sense of a
right to inheritance. 61 Possibly, therefore, the EQA could be con-
strued as also extending into the area bounded by Box B in Figure 2.
Similarly, it is not clear whether the prohibitory function of the
second sentence targets not only citizen-citizen relations, but also gov-
ernment-citizen relations by virtue of the reference to a right "to pro-
61 The authors of the version of the EQA being introduced in state legislatures do
not elaborate on the scope of their proposal sufficiently to draw conclusions in this
regard. In his version of the EQA, however, Rodger Schlickeisen uses the term "com-
mon property" in place of "heritage," and contends that the EQA "should establish
the right to benefits of living nature and explicitly extend the right to future genera-
dons as a class." See Schlickeisen, supra note 12, at 234. The aspirational component
of his EQA thus may be implicit rather than one of its primary purposes.
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tection of other natural resources of the nation." Presumably the
government (though which government is not clear) is supposed to
carry out the "protection" function, in which case the EQA may be
construed as creating not only a prohibition on government actions
failing to protect natural resources, but also those failing to intervene
to prevent citizen actions that threaten the environment. 62 If so, the
EQA also extends into the area defined by Box C in Figure 2.
Regardless of whether we read the EQA to fall narrowly within
Box A only, or broadly to extend also into Boxes B, C, or both, it is
beyond question that the EQA would be a constitutional anomaly.
The core of the proposal falls in the citizen-citizen target category-
enough to raise a red flag-and a reasonable construction of the mea-
sure extends it into the danger zone of the aspirational function cate-
gory. Indeed, at its broadest construction it encompasses a large
range of function-target combinations as no existing amendment
does. In short, the EQA is so out of the ordinary for the function and
target characteristics of constitutional amendments as to raise serious
questions about its candidacy for a position in the Constitution.
III. EVALUATION METRICS: MEASURING CONSTITUTIONAL
AmzNDMENTs BASED ON ACCEPTANCE, NEED, AND IMPLEMENTATION
EQA supporters might suggest that the concerns raised in the
preceding section are matters only of text, and hence they can be
solved simply by changing the text of the proposal to fit more neatly
within the historical experience-i.e., within the shaded area in Fig-
ure 1. Indeed, one value of the classification and plotting of proposed
amendments may be to identify amendments with broad, cumber-
some "footprints" and thereby assist in the drafting process. Tighten-
ing the language to correspond more closely to the historical
amending experience may improve the chances a proposal will be rati-
fied and perform as intended. But it is not so simple for the EQA.
Indeed, the textual analysis reveals much about politics after all, as it is
precisely because the EQA is a social policy maelstrom that its text
appears as it does. And it is precisely because the text appears the way
it does that the EQA should never, and likely will never, become a part
of the Constitution.
I demonstrate both points in this section by asking a series of
questions about the EQA. The questions fall into two categories.
62 This is clearly the intent of Roger Schlickeisen's similarly worded EQA, which
he contends would provide citizens with "a direct means of bringing a cause of action
to prohibit legislative or other government action that violates the government's obli-
gation to protect living nature's benefits." Id.
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First, it does not seem unreasonable to ask of any proposed social pol-
icy amendment whether it is socially acceptable and institutionally
necessary. Few would support a proposal that it is neither. Second,
assuming the proposal fares well under that first-level filter, we should
examine its prospects for practicable implementation given its precise
language and what we know about existing and foreseeable social and
legal institutions. The EQA is clearly disqualified at the first of these
levels, but even giving it a free pass at that level cannot avoid the real-
ity that it is a miserable failure at the second level as well.
A. Level One Filters: Is the Proposal Socially Acceptable and
Institutionally Necessary ?
The EQA's advocates contend, as if there is no question about the
matter, that "[m] ost Americans undoubtedly take it for granted that
they have a right to clean air ... just as they take for granted other
rights of a free society," and that "[t]he only way to address the
mounting threat to sound, foresighted environmental policy-making
appears to be to amend the Constitution itself."63 In so doing they are
appealing to the sensible demand that any social policy amendment to
the Constitution be not only socially acceptable, but also institution-
ally necessary. In other words, a social policy amendment ought to
reflect broad levels of social approval and resolve some institutional
obstacle to allowing that social policy to be fulfilled by means short of
constitutional amendment.
1. Does the Measure Enjoy Broad Social Approval?
The "other rights of a free society" to which the EQA supporters
refer are, of course, the rights detailed in the Constitution, and the
reason most Americans take them for granted is because they are ex-
pressed in the Constitution-they are already constitutive "givens" for
society. Hence it may not be entirely accurate to contend that the
"right to clean air," whatever that may be, is "taken for granted" in the
same sense as the other "rights of a free society." If they are-that is,
if Americans really expect clean air as a constitutive right of society
alongside free speech-then perhaps the EQA is onto something.64
63 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37.
64 One commentator has suggested that the right to a clean environment is "pre-
existing" in the sense that it can be inferred from the Preamble to the Constitution,
which describes as one purpose of the Constitution to "promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. . . ." U.S. CONST.
preamble. See, e.g., Schmaltz, supra note 6, at 458 n.44. Of course, this interpretation
of the Preamble would support a "right" to a good job, a decent home, a good educa-
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On its face, the supermajoritarian ratification procedure of Arti-
cle V suggests that broad and deep social acceptance is a minimum
necessity for any amendment proposal to succeed and thus is a given
for any proposal that does succeed. Indeed, the history surrounding
some failed social policy amendments supports the view of the amend-
ment process as a test of national consensus. 65 Why, therefore, con-
cern ourselves with examining the breadth and depth of support for
proposed amendments?
Relying entirely on Article V, however, may lead to a false sense of
security in this respect Some commentators, for example, have ob-
served that an amendment could be ratified with relatively little active
support if it also has relatively little active opposition and most people
simply believe the measure will not make a significant difference one
way or the other.66 Still others argue that amendments more often
reflect a social mood just short of revolution, a time in which "con-
duct[ing] our legal business as usual, seeking certainty and harmony
rather than tolerating discord, is to miss the very essence of the event
at hand. '67
Under any view, of course, the life or death of an amendment
proposal is a profoundly political question, and there must be some
sizeable group in society that believes deeply in the proposal's
message. That group may be so large that it approaches consensus; it
may be sufficiently large to achieve ratification in the face of the ma-
jority's indifference; or it may be so vocal and driven as eventually to
spark support in larger numbers. Those three paths, however, present
fundamentally different political climates both before and after ratifi-
cation. Given the constitutional disfavor of factions and the American
distrust of special interest groups,68 we should demand that social pol-
tion, and a whole package of other social welfare policies not generally understood as
having the status of pre-existing constitutional rights. Indeed, all efforts to have a
right to a clean environment recognized under the existing Constitution have failed.
See id& at 462-64; Gusack, supra note 22, at 175-79; Futrell, supra note 6, at 50 n.9.
65 See KYVIG, supra note 4, at 394-425 (exploring the political climate leading to
the eventual failure of the Equal Rights Amendment); Pinguelo, supra note 22, at 288
(observing that the experience of New Jersey's ratification of a state constitutional
EQA "demonstrates that non-partisan political support and the support of competing
special interests are key ingredients").
66 See VILE, supra note 20, at 28 (suggesting that this was the eventual Federalist
attitude toward the Bill of Rights, which allowed its ratification).
67 Tribe, supra note 2, at 436.
68 See VILE, supra note 20, at 95-96 (discussing Prohibition and the Equal Rights
Amendment as examples of efforts by special interest groups to achieve constitutional
endorsement of their agendas, one temporarily successful and the other a failure af-
ter long political debate).
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icy amendment proposals demonstrate broad and deep social sup-
port. An amendment made possible by the majority's indifference, or
born of revolutionary zeal, may present unanticipated political tur-
moil after ratification when its support is tested by the realities of im-
plementation. The first question to ask of any amendment proposal,
therefore, ought to focus on defining the base and depth of its
support.
The EQA, for example, fits the third of the support models-the
zealous minority-or at least that is where its supporters have posi-
tioned it. First, although its supporters contend that we all take the
essence of the EQA for granted, they have to concede that the EQA
does not enjoy consensus support. Although the EQA supporters
claim their opposition is limited to a "powerful band of extremist ide-
ologues,"69 suggesting that opposition to the EQA would be isolated
to this out of touch cabal, they also claim that this small band has
carried out what they describe as a "concerted attack on environmen-
tal laws" allied with "powerful economic forces" that have found
"champions in Congress and in state legislatures." But if this alleged
attack is sufficiently serious to prompt proposal of an EQA in re-
sponse, can it represent the views of only an insignificant portion of
society? Indeed, one ought to ask why, if the insurgents are so small a
group, they nonetheless became so powerful, have so deeply influ-
enced Congress and state legislatures, and require an amendment to
the Constitution to put them down. This sounds like all-out war, not
consensus.
The EQA also will not find ratification through the second sup-
port dynamic, that of majority indifference. Indeed, environmental
policy today is characterized by a large centrist group flanked by two
bands of powerful extremist ideologues. On the one side are, in fact,
the forces decried by the EQA supporters, those who place property
rights and personal economic gain ahead of collective environmental
benefits.70 I will refer to them as the "browns." On the other side
69 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37.
70 See, e.g., RON ARNOLD & ALAN GOTrUEB, TRASHING THE ECONOMY. HOW RUN-
AWAY ENVIRONMENTALISM IS WRECKING AMERICA (2d ed. 1994) (manifesto from the
modem property rights movement's informal founders). See generally JACQUELINE
VAUGHN SWAITZER, GREEN BACKLASH: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
OPPOSITION IN THE U.S. (1997) (history of the emergence of the property rights move-
ment); LAND RiGrrs: THE 1990'S PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION (Bruce Yandle ed.,
1995) (collection of essays on the property rights movement). These extreme prop-
erty rights advocates have managed to reshape mainstream politics to the point that
some idols of die-hard preservationists, such as the Endangered Species Act, are fight-
ing to remain intact. See Schlickeisen, supra note 12, at 199-200 (discussing the emer-
gence of the property rights movement and its effects on the Endangered Species Act
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are-no surprise here-the EQA supporters, at least those who are
deeply committed to preservationism as a collective right that
preempts individual rights. I will refer to them as the "greens." Both
the browns and the greens are powerful, ideological, intolerant, com-
mitted, and unyielding. Not surprisingly, centrist-leaning commenta-
tors have begun to ferret out the browns and the greens, and the
pitched battles of rhetoric and brinksmanship they play in political
settings, as the major obstacles to progressive evolution of environ-
mental policy.71
The problem for the greens, of course, is that the browns already
have a home base in the Constitution-the Fifth Amendment's prohi-
bition of governmental takings of private property without just com-
pensation.72 The greens want one too, plain and simple,73 and they
programs and politics); J. B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act:
Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power ofFederal Agencies'Duty to Conserve Species,
25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1137-42 (1995) (same).
71 See, e.g.,J. Baird Callicott & Karen Mumford, Ecological Sustainability as a Conser-
vation Concept, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 32, 34 (1997) (identifying "resourcism" and
"preservationism" as philosophies that dominated the first three quarters of the twen-
tieth century); Marc R. Poirier, Property, Environment, Community, 12 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITG. 43, 45 (1997) (identifying the roots of the "property encomium" and the "envi-
ronmental jeremiad").
72 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Spurred by recent Supreme Court decisions indicating
an increased willingness to find and redress uncompensated takings and exactions,
both the browns and, ironically, the greens, have suggested that the Fifth Amendment
poses a substantial barrier to environmental regulation. In fact the string of recent
decisions has had little effect on environmental regulation and is unlikely, assuming
federal and state governments design environmental regulations with the Fifth
Amendment in mind, to require any fundamental shift in policy or approach. See
Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENv-L. LJ. 439 (1993).
73 See Freyfogle, supra note 14, at 166-71 (describing the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment as fundamentally anti-environmental and concluding that
"[o]ur Constitution needs a green amendment today principally to serve as a counter-
balance" to those provisions). The EQA proposals made to date, however, supply
virtually no enforceable, as opposed to symbolic, counterbalance in that respect. Short
of outright repeal to the takings clause in cases of environmental regulation, an EQA
would not counter the government's duty to compensate in cases of regulatory tak-
ings. In other words, empowering or requiring Congress to protect the environment,
without more, does not alter the duty to compensate in takings cases any more than
the power to regulate commerce between the states does. Moreover, providing Con-
gress the enumerated duty or power to regulate on behalf of the environment, with-
out more, prescribes no level of regulation or method of choosing between
environment and economy. To provide a substantive counter to the alleged anti-envi-
ronment provisions in the Constitution, therefore, an EQA would need to reverse the
takings clause in cases of environmental regulation and actively "tip" government de-
cision-making in favor of the environment when policy decisions present environ-
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know they must play to the center to get it. They also know, however,
that the vast center has not bought into the green agenda. Although
most people in the United States proclaim themselves to be "environ-
mentalists," they are not true greens either in lifestyles or political
views and would sooner give up the environmentalist badge than be-
come so.7
4
The EQA, in other words, does not fit the second model of sup-
port for amendments. Far from being indifferent to questions of envi-
ronmental policy, the center has a well-defined vision of balance
between the two poles and will not tolerate frontal assaults from either
side. Hence the browns' push in the 104th Congress to dilute envi-
ronmental laws and enact a property rights regime was an abysmal
failure.7 5 The EQA proponents may have learned their lesson from
the browns' setback, knowing that their dream agenda, if laid bare in
the EQA, would meet the same fate,76 for the text of the proposal falls
short of saying what they really would like to see in the Constitution-
an environmental trump card on the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. They know that saying so explicitly in the EQA would render
it a political nonstarter. On the other hand, while drafting the mea-
sure to impose an environmental protection right only on the govern-
ment would make the measure more politically acceptable, doing so
would not nullify the government's duty to provide just compensation
ment versus economy choices. No EQA proposal has done so, and, for reasons
outlined in the text, no EQA proposal is likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
74 Public opinion polls show that Americans who say they care about the environ-
ment have grown in number steadily through 1991, to more than 60% of the popula-
tion, and have plateaued at a level at which environmentalism can be considered
"mainstream." Nevertheless, only a small fraction of those "environmentalists" ac-
tively make environmentalism their way of life through dedicated recycling, compost-
ing, water conservation, xeriscape, and so on. See Tibbett L. Speer, Growing in the
Green Market, 19 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 45 (1997); Peter Stisser, A Deeper Shade of Green, 16
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 24 (1994); Traci Watson, For Most Americans, It's not Easy Being
Green, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1998, at 3A. Some commentators find the mainstreaming
of American environmentalism a disturbing indication that environmentalists have
"caved in" to economic development interests, against which they call for emergence
of a new radical, noncompromising environmental movement to regain the ground
they perceive has been lost. See MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRON-
MENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995).
75 See RichardJ. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 708-10
(1997) (tracing the "broadside challenge" to environmental protection laws of the
104th Congress, and demonstrating that "virtually none of the reform efforts resulted
in legislative change").
76 See id. at 710 ("Those who support the basic philosophy and goals of federal
environmental law should not mistake the public's rejection of the 104th congres-
sional agenda for the absence of concerns about unfairness in environmental law.").
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for takings; indeed, it would likely force the government into physical
or regulatory takings situations more frequently than under present
law.
Thus, the EQA supporters appear to be channeling their efforts
into the "quasi-revolution" model of support for amendments. The
text of the EQA, while not directly fulfilling their wish list, is suffi-
ciently green in its prohibitory function to provide them a rallying
point and foothold for future legislative and judicial battles with the
browns, but is sufficiently vague as to what the citizen-citizen rights
mean to avoid engendering swells of opposition from centrist ranks.
Indeed, through a campaign of brown-bashing,77 the EQA propo-
nents hope to spark the revolution that brings the center to their
camp long enough to make the EQA our twenty-eighth amendment.
Before being swept up by the revolutionary fervor, however, it is im-
portant for the centrists to consider what the extremists behind the
EQA really want in the long run. Is the EQA only about what those in
the center already "take for granted"? Are the browns the only target
of the EQA hammer? Or, after the love affair is over, will the greens
turn the EQA on the centrists as well, using the "citizens' duty" feature
of the EQA to wage litigation that undermines property rights advo-
cates' sacred shrine without directly implicating the Takings Clause?
Only ratification of the EQA will tell us in the long run, but do we
really want to know?
The Eighteenth Amendment is our reminder from the past that
the absence of broad and deep social acceptance for the position em-
bodied in a social policy amendment should raise a red flag. The rig-
ors of Article V may obscure which path an amendment takes in
garnering support toward ratification, leading us to believe that we
need not ask the question; yet, as Prohibition illustrates, which path of
support dynamic is taken makes a difference. We should not repeat
the mistake of being lulled into a false sense of security that success or
failure under Article V is all we need to ask in terms of an amend-
ment's support. Rather, even in the early stages of an amendment
proposal's life, we should examine its support dynamic for evidence of
the seeds of postratification calamity. Those seeds unquestionably are
present in the EQA.
77 Most of the literature covering the property rights movement emanates from
groups closely associated with extreme preservationism, who deride the property
rights movement at every opportunity for the effect they have had on the environ-
mentalists' agenda. See, e.g., LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE PROP-
ERTE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (John Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995)
(collection of articles and essays by environmentalists about the property rights
movement).
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2. Can the Measure Not Be Implemented by Means Other Than
Constitutional Amendment?
Assuming that levels of social approval for a proposed social pol-
icy amendment are sufficient to make the chances of ratification sig-
nificant, another question to ask is whether the goal is one that can be
carried out only through constitutional amendment. Measures with
purely functional operations and intra- or intergovernmental relations
targets, such as limiting the terms of the President, have no choice but
to follow the amendment procedure. But social policy decisions, de-
pending on their nature, can be and have been implemented by fed-
eral or state political institutions short of constitutional revision. If
social acceptance of the proposition is significant, why not work it
through those means rather than by constitutional amendment?
One answer, of course, is that the effort required to achieve ratifi-
cation of an amendment, while significant, can lead to a far more
sweeping and permanent expression of the social policy than can be
achieved through federal or state legislation or judicial decision.
Through an amendment, the social policy becomes applicable to all
named institutions regardless of local politics or shifting of coalitions.
Enforcement of the measure, if not carried out aggressively by polit-
ical institutions, can be sought through relentless litigation. Reversal
of the measure, while not impossible, is likely more difficult than re-
versal of legislation. This entrenchment of the social policy is the ulti-
mate prize of an amendment, and is what may make the amendment
route attractive to groups, such as the EQA proponents, that have sig-
nificantly less than consensus support for their underlying social pol-
icy agenda.78
But the political advantages gained by embodying the social pol-
icy in an amendment, real or perceived, do not mean that the social
policy must be implemented through an amendment. If every polit-
ical battle over social policy were settled through constitutional
amendment, the Constitution would begin to operate as a legislative,
rather than constitutive, vehicle for law-it would cease being a consti-
tution. The value of having a constitutive source of law is to provide
"an evolving repository of the nation's core political ideals and as a
record of the nation's deepest ideological battles .... -79 To use the
Constitution as a record of what should be routine legislative deci-
sions, thus cluttering it with "regulatory specifics," results in a docu-
78 See Tribe, supra note 2, at 441-42 ("As the history of prohibition illustrates,
enacting such [substantive] measures through constitutional amendment rather than
by statute renders them dangerously resistant to modification.") (footnote omitted).
79 Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
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ment which can demand no such constitutive respect.8 0 There has to
be some quality of the Constitution that preserves a difference be-
tween it and routine legislative authority.8 '
The question of need, therefore, is whether there is any institu-
tional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely accepted social pol-
icy through routine legislative and judicial forums. Several
amendments, for example, have reversed Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the Constitution that prevented or impeded indoctrination of
widely accepted social policies.8 2 In such instances the Supreme
Court's decision had "stuck" the institutional machinery in a position
contrary to desired social policy. In different circumstances some
amendments have forced an intransigent minority of states to come
into line with the rest of the nation on fundamental social policy is-
sues associated with matters traditionally (or constitutionally) left to
state jurisdiction.8 3 Where federal legislation cannot impose the pol-
icy over state resistance and the courts cannot mold the existing con-
stitutional text to handle the stubborn states, an amendment is the
only alternative. These are examples of institutional necessity, where
an amendment, and only an amendment, can allow the widely ac-
cepted social policy to move forward in society. Amendment propos-
als that do not satisfy this condition ought to be avoided.8 4
That kind of necessity cannot be attributed to the EQA. Rather,
concerned that the browns are winning some battles in federal and
80 Id.
81 See Griffin, supra note 22, at 2137 ("One purpose of placing only the most
fundamental principles in the Constitution was to preserve the difference between
the Constitution and ordinary law.").
82 The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, giving full citizenship to all
persons born or naturalized in the United States, reversed the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Dred Scott v. Sanfor, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), that the Missouri Compro-
mise barring slavery from the territories was unconstitutional. The Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, giving voting rights to citizens eighteen years and older, reversed the
Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970), that the Constitution does
not prohibit the states from establishing twenty-one as the minimum voting age. The
Nineteenth Amendment, giving voting rights to women, nullified an 1874 decision of
the Court in Minorv. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), ruling that states could
limit voting rights to men alone. See generally Dellinger, supra note 20, at 414-15;
Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 686-89.
83 The voting rights amendments, for example, not only negated Supreme Court
rulings leaving matters of enfranchisement to the states, see supra note 48, but also
then dictated the national policy to all the states.
84 See also Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 10-11 (including as one of the
criteria for evaluating amendment proposals the condition that "Constitutional
amendments should be utilized only when there are significant practical or legal ob-
stacles to the achievement of the same objective by other means").
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state legislatures and courts, the EQA proponents have wildly over-
stated the degree of threat to make it appear as if a case of institu-
tional necessity, and not merely a political rumble, is at hand.8 5 For
example, they contend that the Supreme Court "has reinterpreted the
commerce clause of the Constitution to set limits on congressional
authority to enact laws protecting public health, safety and welfare. '86
They refer to the Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Lopez,8 7
ruling that federal legislation banning guns near schools exceeded
congressional authority because the prohibited actions did not sub-
stantially affect interstate comfmerce. In fact, the decision does not
"reinterpret" the Commerce Clause,88 and has had no discernible ef-
fect on Congress' ability to craft environmental regulation. 9 The
EQA proponents are on equally shaky ground when they contend that
the amendment is institutionally necessary because the Court "has
barred suits by private citizens to compel state governments to carry
85 Some commentators advocating adoption of an EQA do not go so far as to
make the institutional necessity argument, but rather focus on what they contend is
generally the "conservatism" of the Supreme Court in environmental issues and the
propensity of Congress to accede to economic interests adverse to the environment.
See, e.g., Schmaltz, supra note 6, at 453; Schlickeisen, supra note 12, at 229-33. Assum-
ing the necessity criterion were relaxed, it remains unclear how these commentators
believe an EQA, short of prescribing regulatory specifics, would prevent the Supreme
Court and Congress from continuing their track record when it comes time to imple-
ment and interpret the EQA. See infra text accompanying notes 105-10.
86 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37.
87 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
88 See William Funk, The Lopez Report, 23 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1, 1 (1998).
89 See id. at 14-15 (reviewing environmental regulation cases decided under Lo-
pez). One court has invalidated an environmental regulation that purported to ex-
tend jurisdiction over actions that could affect, rather than substantially affect,
interstate commerce. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). Be-
cause the court found the rule exceeded the statutory grant of authority to the
agency, the court only suggested that the regulation may also exceed the reach of
federal constitutional power. See id. at 257. Beyond that minor potential setback,
which the agency can redress simply by redrafting the regulation to include the magic
word substantially, no environmental regulation has suffered harm under Loper. See,
e.g., National Home Builders Ass'n v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1045-53 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(application of Endangered Species Act to protect intrastate habitat of an endangered
fly does not exceed Congress' commerce power); United States v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (application of Superfund law to isolated, intrastate con-
taminated site does not exceed Congress' commerce power); Solid Waste Agency of
North Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 998 F. Supp. 946, 951-53
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (application of Clean Water Act section 404 to protect isolated intra-
state wetlands does not exceed Congress' commerce power).
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out environmental laws"90 and "curtailed the ability of Congress to
require state adherence to national environmental standards." 91 In
short, the argument that the Supreme Court has erected institutional
barriers to progressive environmental policy that can be torn down
only with a constitutional amendment is specious at best, perhaps even
disingenuous.92
Moreover, despite the slowing of federal and state environmental
regulation that the browns have achieved on some fronts, it could not
reasonably be said that federal environmental policy cannot be in-
stalled over the wishes of intransigent states. The Lopez case provided
90 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37. This charge is leveled against the
Court's decision that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought under so-called
"citizen suit" provisions, which are found in many federal environmental laws, to com-
pel state compliance with federal law. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996). The effects of the decision are narrow, however, as (1) the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not apply to city, county, and other sub-state governmental entities; (2) the
Court specifically preserved the Ex Parte Young doctrine allowing citizens to sue state
officials for violating federal laws; and (3) the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from enforcing federal law against states or from preempting state law
altogether. See PERCrVAL, supra note 8, at 332-34.
91 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37. Here their concern is with New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which held that Congress may not compel the
states to enact or implement environmental regulations. The Court held that Con-
gress could not require states to take title to low-level nuclear waste if they did not
permit a disposal facility for such waste. See id. at 159-66. The decision does not,
however, prevent Congress from imposing federal environmental protection regula-
tions directly on or in the states. Moreover, the Court specifically upheld the practice,
commonly used in federal environmental laws adopting so-called "cooperative feder-
alism" frameworks, of enticing the states to adopt and enforce federal law as state law
through financial support and delegation of authority. See id at 166-69. By preserv-
ing such approaches, and precluding only the approach of forcing states to regulate
in line with federal wishes, the impact of the decision is minimal in environmental
law. See PERCIVAL, supra note 8, at 118-19.
92 Indeed, a growing body of literature outlines how, in the appropriate political
climate, biodiversity can be protected through extension of existing legislative initia-
tives, and with greater speed and precision than an EQA could offer. See RichardJ.
Blaustein, Biodiversity and the Law, 26 EuvrL. L. 1313, 1318 (1996) (reviewing Bi-
ODIvERsrry AND THE LAW (William J. Snape III ed., 1996)) (arguing that the time it
would take for judicial interpretation to put the EQA in motion on behalf of biodiver-
sity protection is too long compared to the other avenues of legal reform suggested in
the biodiversity literature such as the book reviewed). By contrast, the Supreme
Court has struck down state and federal legislation prohibiting burning of the United
States flag. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (federal legislation);
Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (state legislation). Advocates of the flag burn-
ing amendment, therefore, have a legitimate argument that their amendment, assum-
ing it were to gain sufficient public support, is institutionally necessary. See
Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 12.
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the best ammunition the browns have had since the dawn of federal
command-and-control regulation to erect a federalism barrier to envi-
ronmental regulation, and it fell far short of insulating states from the
federal will. Indeed, many commentators believe the states offer the
best hope for progressive and innovative evolution of environmental
protection policy.93 The states are far out in front of the federal gov-
ernment in programs dealing innovatively and effectively with such
thorny issues as ecosystem protection policy,94 growth management, 95
and nonpoint source water pollution. 96 The problem for the greens,
if anything, is Congress, and whether it remains committed to impos-
ing national environmental policy consistent with the green agenda
through federal legislation. That is a political question, however, not
a matter of institutional structure that can be solved only through an
amendment to the Constitution.
93 One leading environmental law commentator goes so far as to say that "[olne
need only look to America's own states-its environmental 'test tubes'-for signs of
important environmental goings-on." Bud Ward, The Train Moves On, 11 ENVrL. F. 41,
46 (1994). See alsoJohn Pendergrass, You Say You Want a Devolution, 12 ENVTL. F. 8
(1995) ("[Mlany, if not most, of the best and most innovative ideas in environmental
and natural resource protection have come from the states."); John Pendergrass, A
Rich History of State Innovation, 11 ENVrL. L. 12 (1994) (describing several of the ideas
emanating from states that eventually became embedded in federal requirements ap-
plicable to all states); Robert L. Rhodes, Jr., WhereDo We Go from Here? Reforming U.S.
Environmental Laws In Congress, 26 Env't Rep (BNA) 991 (1995) (contending that
"state governments are more able to take on a large role in protecting the environ-
ment"); State Cleanup Systems Mfore Effective Than Federal Superfund Program, Report Says,
26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 982 (1995) (former EPA official contends "[s] tates are cleaning
up contaminated waste sites 'at a fraction of the time and cost' of the federal
superfund program"). Recently, in order to share with each other their innovations
and successes, the states formed the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS). See
Mary A. Gade, When the States Come Marching In, NAT. REsouRcES & ENV'T, Winter
1996, at 3. (Ms. Gade, the director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
and first president of ECOS, contends that "the environmental system that has given
us unprecedented and extraordinary environmental progress to date, is now outmo-
ded and unable to meet the environmental challenges ahead. And that is where the
states come marching in-somewhat brazenly and clearly in lockstep.").
94 See Sara Parker, The CRM Approach: Protecting Missouri's Natural Heritage, NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 10; Douglas P. Wheeler, An Ecosystem Approach to
Species Protection, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 7.
95 See George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth Management: Vermont, Oregon, and
a Synthesis, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 13.
96 See M. Allison Hamm, The Massachusetts Experience with Nonpoint Sources: Regula-
tors Beware!, NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 47.
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B. Level Two Filters: Can the Proposal Be Practicably Implemented?
A finding of acceptance and need for an amendment does not
end the inquiry, as we must examine the language chosen for the
measure to ensure it will practicably implement what the amendment
prescribes as social policy. A long list of factors may go into describing
the implementability of any legal measure, 97 but three basic qualities
appear of particular importance for purposes of evaluating the text of
constitutional amendments: enforceability; clarity; and durability. The
EQA, for example, fails in all three respects.
1. Is the Measure Easily Reducible to Legally Enforceable
Principles and Means?
When a polity's constitutive document speaks of the creation of
rights and the prohibition of government actions, it ought also to es-
tablish the means of delivering on those promises. In other words, a
means of enforcement is essential to prevent the constitutive purpose
from dissolving into aspirational emptiness, and ultimately, losing its
constitutive impact. Of course, no amendment to the Constitution is
completely self-executing; 98 rather, each depends on the institutional
structure established in the main body of the document for its en-
forcement. Commentators have differed over which of the two princi-
pal sources of enforcement, the Supreme Court acting through
interpretation or Congress acting through legislation, provides a bet-
ter platform for implementation of social policy amendments. 99 In
97 For example, in his comparison of the three different vehicles of constitutional
change-amendmentsjudicial interpretations, and legislation-John Vile uses a wide
array of criteria: ease, range, direction, speed, visibility, stability, flexibility, democ-
racy, protection of minority rights, susceptibility to special interests, federalism, sepa-
ration of powers, perceived legitimacy, historical and textual support, safety and
regularity, prolixity and style, clarity, unity, deliberation, respect for the Constitution,
and constitutional atrophy, efficacy, finality, adequacy, and interaction. See VILE,
supra note 20, at 85-115. Many of his criteria focus on procedural qualities; the rest
can be encapsulated in the three broad qualities I describe.
98 See Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 15 ("most existing constitutional
amendments are . . . silent regarding the means of enforcement"). Some amend-
ments go so far as to at least specify which governmental bodies may enforce the
measure. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (repealed Dec. 5, 1933) ("The Con-
gress and the several States shall have the concurrent power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."); U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, § 2 ("The Congress shall have
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
99 Compare Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 241 (1993)
(advocating a legislatively enforced, aspirational style of constitutionalism), with
Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 269 (1993) (contending
the U.S. model of ajudicially enforced constitution is superior).
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either case, however, there must be something tangible in the mea-
sure for the authority to enforce. The measure must be capable of
being translated into enforcement tools suited to the enforcement
body, which requires such basics as terms capable of being defined,
prohibitions with parameters capable of being described, and expres-
sions of rights capable of being detailed in enforcement mediums.100
As the EQA strikingly illustrates, however, the challenge of draft-
ing enforceable text can be insurmountable for social policy amend-
ments. At the most basic level, for example, it will be difficult to define
what comprise "the natural resources of the nation." What are "natu-
ral resources" besides the air and water referred to in the text? Some
may think only of mineral resources, whereas others may include
grander ideas, such as biodiversity, in the array of natural resources.
Once we resolve that issue, does the "of the nation" language qualify-
ing natural resources mean that only those natural resources belong-
ing to the United States government are included within the scope of
the EQA, or are resources in state, local, and private hands also
covered?
Even if we could agree on the meanings of those and other key
terms in the EQA, defining the scope of the rights and prohibitions
created in the EQA would present innumerable conundrums. Will
"clean and healthful air" be measured based on every citizen, includ-
ing those highly sensitive to pollution, or the average citizen? Does
the "heritage" right literally mean a right to inheritance, or is it simply
an aspirational ideal? If heritage is meant to convey some legally en-
forceable right, does the reference to "generations" (of whom, United
States citizens or all people of the world?) mean that all resources
covered under the amendment, whichever those may be, are held in
common? If the answer is that the EQA is not so sweeping, but rather
should be treated as simply a constitutional codification of the doc-
trine of common law nuisance, 101 why do we need the amendment?
Assuming those scope questions can be decided, the text poses
difficult questions regarding the mechanics of enforcement. For ex-
ample, how would present and future generations exercise their natu-
ral resources heritage rights against a private landowner who wishes to
harvest trees or minerals for personal profit? Could any citizen pre-
vent any other citizen from extracting minerals, harvesting trees, farm-
ing, developing land, operating a manufacturing plant, or engaging in
100 See Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 15 (Proposing that "Constitutional
amendments should embody enforceable, and not purely aspiration, standards.").
101 Some commentators see this as one benefit of the EQA. See Howard, supra
note 22, at 203; Schlickeisen, supra note 12, at 234.
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any other activity that results in the loss of a natural resource? Could
a citizen also sue the government to argue it has failed to protect natu-
ral resources when it issues a permit to, say, fill a wetlands? Will the
government be required to take property by regulation in order to
protect the natural resources, and if so will not compensation remain
due under the Fifth Amendment notwithstanding the EQA? In short,
the EQA, by targeting both citizen-citizen and government-citizen re-
lations, seems poised to launch a tsunami of litigation over everyday
life and between ordinary citizens. If that scenario is not possible
under the EQA-that is, if the amendment does not mean what its
text appears to say-then what does the amendment mean?
To be sure, no constitutional amendment has avoided questions
like these having to do with definitions, scope, and mechanics of en-
forcement.102 But there is no reasonable basis for arguing that the
EQA will ever lead us to answers to the questions, and that inability
has proven fatal to other social policy amendment proposals. 10 3 The
experience of environmental law over the past two decades has been
one of unparalleled proliferation of regulatory and judicial text at-
tempting to get a handle on these issues.10 4 It is not clear how the
EQA will simplify or otherwise change that legal regime, as it cannot
simplify or otherwise change the underlying problems inherent in en-
vironmental management.
102 For a discussion of how state EQAs have fared with respect to similar questions
of interpretation, showing how state courts have differed over a variety of fundamen-
tal implementing terms and mechanisms, see Cusack, supra note 22, at 182-96.
103 See Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 17 ("Proponents of the equal rights
amendment were never able to answer questions about the specific legal effects of the
amendment.").
104 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency accounts for the over 10,000 pages
of final regulations found in title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the
agency published almost 3500 pages of preamble and proposed and final regulations
in the Federal Register during the first six months of 1994 alone. SeeJerry L. Ander-
son, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 395, 413 (1995). The
combined efforts of the EPA and the many other federal agencies with some environ-
mental regulation jurisdiction "chum out over 35 pages of new or proposed regula-
tions every working day." Id. at 413. Guidance to help interpret these regulations
abounds in even vaster quantities. The EPA's hazardous waste management regula-
tions, for example, filled 697 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations in 1994, but
there were 19,500 pages of informal guidance accompanying them. See William H.
Rodgers Jr., Environmental Law Trivia Test No. 2, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 807, 812,
816 (1995).
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2. Is the Measure Sufficiently Clear to Minimize Unintended
Interpretations?
The use of simple, but precise, drafting has long been considered
essential for the practicable implementation of constitutive princi-
ples. 10 5 This is not simply a good grammar maxim, as failure clearly to
textualize the intended social policy outcome can lead to unintended
interpretations and applications.1 0 6
For example, many of the enforcement problems hypothesized
above with respect to the EQA are problems of clarity, or rather the
lack thereof. The EQA supporters presumably believe the measure
necessarily will be implemented, as they put it, "to continue the im-
pressive environmental progress achieved by the nation over the last
30 years."107 But given that the EQA proponents point to the
Supreme Court and Congress as the chief culprits behind the inter-
ruption of that record, it is unclear how they could conclude that the
EQA will return us to the greens' intended course. Indeed, the EQA
does not reverse any of the Supreme Court decisions that its support-
ers point to as the institutional barriers to green environmental policy,
and it does not clearly require anything of Congress. The questions I
pose with respect to enforcement of the EQA thus could be answered
by Congress or the Court in ways that eviscerate the EQA of all mean-
ing, and nothing in the EQA could prevent that from occurring. 08
Indeed, this has been exactly the experience under many state consti-
tution EQAs. 109 If the EQA proponents are banking on a turnaround
in Congress and the Court, they had better hope it happens before the
105 See Griffin, supra note 22, at 2137 (stating that one of the guiding principles
articulated during the Federal Convention of 1787 was to use simple and precise
language).
106 See Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 16 ("[P]roponents of constitu-
tional amendments should attempt to think through and articulate the consequences
of their proposals, including ways in which the amendments would interact with other
constitutional provisions and principles.").
107 Brodsky & Russman, supra note 12, at 37.
108 See Futrell, supra note 6, at 55-56 (observing that an EQA could vest greater
environmental regulation authority in the Supreme Court, which has "tradition-
ally. . . been more closely aligned with the defense of property rights," and thus could
"remove the action from the environmentalist's home base (Congress)").
109 See Honvich, supra note 22, at 326 ("Time and again, state courts have limited
the impact of these environmental provisions. State courts have repeatedly held these
environmental provisions are not self-executing: the courts ruled that they create no
new rights, impose no new obligations and establish no new limits on government or
private action in the absence of state legislation implementing their terms.") (foot-
notes omitted).
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EQA is ratified, or else the EQA could be used against them.110 Ironi-
cally, therefore, in their barter of ambiguous text in return for in-
creased chances of social acceptance, the EQA supporters have
drafted an amendment that opens the green agenda wide to the very
attack they contend requires the amendment in the first place.
3. Is the Measure Sufficiently Stable and Flexible to Provide an
Enduring Statement of Social Policy?
The Constitution can provide the place for "an authoritative
statement of the nation's most important and enduring values."' To
be enduring in that respect, however, the text of an amendment must
balance between stability and flexibility with respect to the future, lest
it meet the fate of the Eighteenth Amendment. Stability, thanks to
Article V, is the hallmark of the Constitution when compared to legis-
lation.11 2 An amendment's ability to "freeze" social policy into future
generations makes it an attractive source of permanence. The Thir-
teenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery, for example, is not the
type of decision we consider open for ongoing legislative "discussion"
now or in the future. On the other hand, social policy decisions for
which we desire that degree of permanence may be rare, and misjudg-
ing the undulations of social norms while freezing one generation's
conception into place can lead to grave mistakes such as the Eight-
eenth Amendment. Mistakes can be undone even in the Constitution,
but as we become lackadaisical in that respect the Constitution will
begin to resemble the legislative process and lose its authoritative po-
tency. Leaving some room for legislative and judicial interpretations
of an amendment's policy statement, while sacrificing some of the
permanence of the statement, can provide the escape valve for when
social norms drift. Flexibility, therefore, may be a necessary feature of
a social policy amendment if it is expected to endure. Hence, when
considering a social policy amendment, "the key.., is to decide which
objects of government are permanent and which are not,"113 and then
devise a text that captures the appropriate balance between stability
and flexibility.
110 On the other hand, if the hoped-for turnaround happens sooner rather than
later, the argument for institutional necessity becomes even weaker than it is today.
See supra text accompanying notes 63-96.
111 Tribe, supra note 2, at 441.
112 See VILE, supra note 20, at 91-92.
113 Id. at 92. See also Developing Standards, supra note 21, at 7 ("[C]onstitutional
amendments should address matters of more than immediate concern that are likely
to be recognized as of abiding importance by subsequent generations.").
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The EQA, for example, could not be faulted for addressing a
topic of only transitory importance. Environmental quality will re-
main of abiding importance to humans for as long as there are
humans. Where the EQA goes astray, however, is in its lack of flexibil-
ity in dealing with the inherent intergenerationality of the environ-
ment. Just as some commentators have observed that the New Deal
legislation finds no place marker in the Constitution notwithstanding
its extensive legislative record,11 4 neither does the extensive federal
command-and-control environmental regulation framework spawned
in the last thirty years. The EQA is an overt attempt to lock that re-
gime into place for the future. But the effort comes at a time when
the weight of environmental policy commentary concludes that the
command-and-control regime is out of date and out of touch.115 At
all levels of deliberation, the emerging theme of sustainable develop-
ment is focusing environmental policy on the future, but in a way that
eschews extrapolation of the sea of predefined rules and interminable
litigation characteristic of the old style of environmental policy."16
The EQA, by contrast, would lock us into the regulate-litigate model
of environmental policy as a matter of constitutive principle. Like the
Eighteenth Amendment, the sure fate of the EQA, drafted as it is,
would be ignominy instead of endurance.
114 See VILE, supra note 20, at 92.
115 The movement for reform of environmental regulation based on the need for
more flexibility has rapidly permeated a wide array of environmental issues. See Sym-
posium, Regulatory Reform, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 155 (1998) (collecting articles
describing flexibility reform initiatives in air pollution law, worker safety and health
law, endangered species protection law, mining law, contaminated sites remediation
law, and other fields).
116 At its broadest, sustainable development is the philosophy that today's progress
must not come at tomorrow's expense, and that human progress thus must be sus-
tained notjust in a few places for a few years, but for the entire planet into the distant
future. SeeJonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 83,
83 (1997). In its description of the need to depart from the command-and-control
model in order to implement sustainable development policy, the President's Council
on Sustainable Development succinctly stated:
For the last 25 years, government has relied on command-and-control regu-
lation as its primary tool for environmental management. In looking to the
future, society needs to adopt a wider range of strategic environmental pro-
tection approaches that embrace the essential components of sustainable de-
velopment ....
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 26 (1996).
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IV. CONCLUSION
An EQA is unlikely to find its way into the Constitution in the
foreseeable future. So why talk about it? One reason is to understand
better why what an amendment says is as important as the politics
within which it rises or falls. The need for any amendment to express
a function and a target in constitutive terms makes drafting vitally im-
portant. And, through analysis of what is said in those regards, we can
identify text that would pull an amendment into the danger zones of
constitutive possibilities. When those red flags are raised, we can then
explore deeper into the text to probe its political roots and its future
implementation prospects. By doing so for the EQA, we learn it is no
mystery why, notwithstanding the elegant message of environmental-
ism it exudes, the EQA will not, and should not, become a part of our
constitutional law.
Another reason to dwell on this sure fate of the EQA is to under-
stand better the problems that beset the making of social policy at the
legislative and judicial levels. The correct environmental policy is not
as clear-cut as, say, our convictions that free speech is vital and slavery
is evil. The latter are not characterized by large gray areas or compet-
ing social values. But environmental policy, like economic policy, ed-
ucation policy, welfare policy, and most of social policy in general, is
defined by hard choices and complicated, multidimensional
problems. The reason the Environmental Protection Agency has over
ten thousand pages of rules is because that's how many it takes to
tackle the problem. To think that environmental policy can be
summed up in two sentences thus seems naive, if not ludicrous.
Finally, to understand why the EQA is a constitutional metrics
misfit allows us to understand better why there also is not a GoodJobs
Amendment or a Nice Homes Amendment in the Constitution. We
made a choice, over two centuries ago, to craft an operational
blueprint for government that would adopt social policy sparingly and
only when it was clear that the policy could and would be delivered.
Constitutions of other nations loaded with aspirational statements and
promises of good housing and jobs have become the subject of jokes
because they fail to deliver. They fail to deliver because, in the end,
how can they? Few social policy goals can be expressed as more than
aspirations, something we work toward by using the institutional tools
made available under the constitutive scheme. If we wish for the Con-
stitution to avoid becoming a joke, we will do as we have done for
centuries-we will continue to keep the EQA and all amendments
with like "metrics" out of our Constitution's text.
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